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ABHINAY MUTHOO AND KENNETH A. SHEPSLE
1. Introduction
Studies of political economy in recent years have placed emphasis on the operating
characteristics of political and economic institutions. The premise of this work is that
constitutional features of the political economy provide a structure of institutional
incentives inducing equilibrium behavior and practices by optimizing agents. At both
the theoretical and empirical levels there are comparisons in the literature of the
equilibrium tendencies of classes of political arrangements (see, for example, Persson
and Tabellini 2000, 2005, respectively). Political agents behave diﬀerently (targeting
beneﬁts, producing public goods, regulating the economy, extracting rents), and the
eﬀects of their collective choices diﬀer (size and composition of spending, level of debt,
productivity and growth of the economy) in presidential and parliamentary regimes, in
unicameral and bicameral legislatures, under majoritarian and proportional electoral
systems, and more generally in autocratic and democratic political economies. This
research has made clear that explanations of collective choice require attention to
institutional building blocks in order to anticipate equilibrium performance under
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diﬀerent conﬁgurations. These explanations, in turn, provide a rational basis for ex
ante constitutional decisions.
To date, most of the work has entailed comparisons between broad institutional
regimes. Empirical work demonstrates that even crude distinctions, like that between
majoritarian and proportional electoral arrangements, uncover systematic diﬀerences
in the form of behavior and the content of outcomes. In the present paper we extend
this style of analysis but focus on some micro-institutional diﬀerences.
We take a garden-variety instance of distributive politics — a divide-the-cake stage
game — and explore dynamic extensions in diﬀerent institutional contexts. In one
institutional setting there is repeated play of the stage game in a unicameral legislative
body, where each period of play is separated by an election in which all legislators face
renewal. In a second setting the term length for the unicameral body is two periods,
the stage game is played once in each of two periods, there is an election at the end
of each period (as in the ﬁrst setting), but with only a subset of legislators facing
reelection in that period. The ﬁrst setting entails simultaneous legislator reelection,
while the second setting captures the incentives faced by legislators in a staggered-
term legislature. The analysis of these settings permits us to unpack the “electoral
connection” under varying institutional conditions.
We then combine these building blocks into an analysis of bicameralism. We estab-
lish the operating characteristics of a dual legislature, each chamber responsible for
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dividing half a cake, when both are simultaneous-term bodies, both are staggered-
term bodies, and when there is one chamber of each type.1 These positive results
allow us to consider how features of political institutions should initially be arranged
at a “constitutional moment.” Our basic bicameralism model also permits us to
move beyond simple distributive politics tasks like dividing a cake to incorporate
consideration of taxation and public goods.
The analysis of bicameralism is of interest in its own right inasmuch as we observe
single-period term, multi-period term, simultaneous-election, and staggered-election
legislatures, individually and in bicameral combination, empirically. A second virtue
of this approach is that it provides a foundation for assessing whether generalizations
drawn on the basis of relatively broad institutional distinctions, as is common in
the current literature, are robust to ﬁner-grained distinctions. Finally, we are in a
position to explore endogenous institutional choice.
2. Bicameralism: Conventional Accounts
There is a wealth of historical material on the emergence and evolution of legislative
bodies, principally as advisors to (and later providers of protection from) rulers. We
provide a sketch of this history as it pertains to bicameralism below. Following this
we review some of the models of bicameral legislative choice. We shall see that there
1Empirically, each chamber of a bicameral legislature passes a legislative bill and there is an ex
post reconciliation of these proposals. In the United States this resolution occurs in a conference
procedure. In many distributive politics situations, however, each chamber is eﬀectively given a
portion of the cake to divide and their respective proposals are simply added together ex post. See
Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams, and Hanson (2007).
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are a number of models of bicameralism related to our own. The main shortcomings
of these models, however, are in not exploring dynamic extensions and in not taking
variation in term structure across chambers into account. In eﬀect, bicameralism
is modeled as joint choice by two symmetric, essentially identical chambers. Our
own approach makes dynamics and term structure central elements, and we trace
the consequences of these in succeeding sections. (There are virtually no theoretical
papers, though an occasional empirical one, on the distinction between simultaneous-
term and staggered-term chambers.)
2.1. Historical Backdrop. The historical roots of bicameralism extend back at least
as far as the classical societies of Greece and Rome. These were not instances of dual
legislative chambers by which we know modern bicameralism, but more like advisory
bodies to the ruler. There is evidence of these in Athens, Sparta, Crete, Carthage,
and early Rome (Tsebelis and Money, 1997). They did sometimes assume a quasi-
representative character, with assemblies representing diﬀerent classes of citizen. Set
next to such “representative” assemblies were smaller councils of advisors to the ruler,
thus giving the institutional arrangement the nominal appearance of bicameralism.
Early Rome, in fact, had a council of elders to advise the ruler that has given modern
upper chambers their name – the Senate. Arrangements such as these appeared
in Europe throughout and beyond the ﬁrst millenium, with religious bodies often
overlayed on, or thoroughly integrated with, secular ones.
As the “mother of parliaments,” Britain developed some of the earliest institu-
tional practices that came to be imitated throughout the western world. By the
ninth century Angles and Saxons had ﬁrmly established a presence in England and
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governed via quasi-military organizations. Various “courts” were established (courts
of law, the hundreds court, the shire court) that diﬀerent classes of individuals were
expected to attend upon a summons from the ruler. In these settings the judicial,
the legislative, and the administrative were blended as disputes were resolved, laws
enacted, and decisions implemented. Over the next several centuries these sometimes
advisory, often military-like bodies morphed into a pair of legislative chambers. One
contained geographically based representatives (e.g., two knights from each shire) and
the other privileged or entitled individuals (earls, dukes, lords, etc.). By the end of
the thirteenth century, an arrangement of two chambers one of which consisted of
“(s)elected” local representatives and which met with some regularity was ﬁrmly in
place. Of great signiﬁcance for the political importance of a separate powerful legis-
lature was the written commitment by King John in 1215 to seek consent from the
parliament to levy taxes above and beyond those to which he was entitled by feudal
prerogative. This provided elites a focal venue for coordination to protect themselves
from royal exploitation. While we cannot develop the subsequent history in any de-
tail (see Gneist 1886 for a thorough account), we should note that over the next ﬁve
centuries the British parliament was transformed from an institution summoned into
being at the discretion of the ruler to one that met on regular occasions and developed
an existence and policy inclinations independent of the ruler’s wishes.
By the end of the bloody seventeenth century, following civil war, regicide, experi-
mentation with a republic, restoration of the monarch, and a second deposing, power
had permanently shifted from the king to the parliament, the latter now a bicameral
body that met regularly. The upper chamber, Lords, consisted of hereditary and life
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peers (whose number varied with the disposition of the king to create them). The
lower chamber, Commons, represented individuals satisfying a substantial property
requirement (essentially the “gentry”). It is estimated that the electorate of mid-
seventeenth century England and Wales was 160,000 (Gneist, 285). Thus, a legisla-
ture consisting of two chambers that met regularly and whose consent was necessary
for most initiatives of the ruler, especially the provision of supply, was ﬁrmly in place.
At this same time England’s North American colonies were crafting institutions of
their own. With some exceptions, they produced colonial legislatures that had the
look and feel of the mother-country parliament back in London.2
The innovation of the United States Constitution late in the eighteenth century
was the creation of a bicameral arrangement that replaced a class basis for chamber
representation with a modiﬁed federal basis. The “great compromise” of the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 allowed for lower chamber representation based on
population and upper chamber representation based on equality among the states.
It also adopted the principal of “partial renewal” for the upper chamber in which,
because the term of a senator was six years and that of a representative two, only
a fraction of senators would be subject to replacement at the end of each two-year
Congress. (The entire House is subject to renewal at the conclusion of a Congress.)
2Tsebelis and Money (1997, 27) report the irony that all the North American colonial legisla-
tures began as unicameral. By the time of the American revolution, however, all but Georgia and
Pennsylvania had become bicameral. The typical pattern was for the press of business to cause the
creation of a subset of the unicameral legislative chamber as a separate “standing council.” This
was eﬀectively a combined agenda-setting agent and executive committee, but was transformed over
time into a second chamber.
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Thus the House is a simultaneous-term (full-renewal) chamber and the Senate is a
staggered-term (partial-renewal) chamber.
British class-based bicameralism and American federal-based bicameralism were
the two prevailing models that proved inﬂuential in the nineteenth century as many
continental European countries moved away from absolutism to representative democ-
racy. One pattern, following the British experience, was for some form of Estates Gen-
eral of medieval origin, with a number of privileged classes or categories represented
in separate chambers (often serving as no more than consultative to the monarch)
to transform itself into dual legislative chambers. The upper chamber served to em-
power and protect a landed aristocracy or other elite from the potential predations of
the popular chamber. Another pattern, following the American example, applied to
confederations. Many of these, as reported in Tsebelis and Money (1997, 31-32), ac-
tually began as unicameral, its members essentially ambassadors from the territorial
units of the confederation. The pressure of republicanism and popular participation
in the wake of the French and American revolutions transformed these arrangements
into bicameral structures, preserving the representation of local units in one chamber
and adding popular representation in the other. In each of these patterns, established
centers of power, whether landed elites, the bourgeosie, or local governmental units,
protected themselves in a second chamber while extending popular representation in a
ﬁrst chamber. As noted by Lascelles (1952, 202-203), “Of course, no second chamber
can stop a revolution but it can check the abuse of power by constitutional means or
the use of it in an oppressive manner...”
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We conclude this historical tour with some brief observations about the last century
and the contemporary scene. Bicameralism, as we have seen, emerged as a medieval
development (with traces of more ancient roots) but has been mainly a modern phe-
nomenon associated with the rise (or re-creation) of the state. Important dates are
1215 and 1688 in England, 1787 in the US, 1789 in France, the nineteenth century in
the rest of Western Europe, and the last decade of the twentieth century in Eastern
Europe. By the end of the twentieth century, bicameralism was mainly associated
with large, rich countries. In 183 parliamentary democracies counted by Patterson
and Mughan (1999), 122 are unicameral and mostly small; sixty-one are bicameral
and mostly large. (They also note that most municipalities around the world have
unicameral councils.) In a report posted on the website of the French Senat (2000), it
is noted that there has been a near doubling of the number of bicameral legislatures
in the last twenty-ﬁve years – presumably an eﬀect of the spread of democracy to
former communist states in Eastern Europe. It also notes that of the ﬁfteen countries
with the highest GDP only two (China and Korea) are unicameral.
2.2. Rationales for Bicameralism. We are, of course, not the ﬁrst to explore the
operating characteristics or examine the normative attractions of bicameralism. Why
bicameralism? This is really two questions – why more than one legislative chamber?
and why no more than two legislative chambers? As we shall see, the literature
addresses the ﬁrst question but not the second.
An early explanation for bicameral legislative arrangements emerged from realpoli-
tik. Whether an explicit compromise as developed in the US constitutional conven-
tion, or an implicit recognition by existing elites as happened in much of Europe,
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the emergence of new sources of political power or the threat of political challenges
to the established order induced institutional accommodation. This accommodation
often took the form of balancing competing bases for representation. Dual legislative
chambers, in eﬀect, provided a more convenient and ﬂexible institutional solution
than attempting to house alternative representational considerations under a single
institutional roof.3 In suggesting that representational diversity is a force for bicam-
eralism, Patterson and Mughan (1999, 10) point out that, circa 1990, 54 of 66 unitary
democracies were unicameral while 18 of 19 federal democracies were bicameral. And,
as we noted above, they also suggest that a unicameral structure is associated with
smaller, and presumably more homogenous, polities while bicameralism is associated
with larger, heterogeneous polities.
The most comprehensive set of claims in favor of bicameralism is the one oﬀered
in Federalist #62 and #63 4. Their ﬁrst claim is that the upper chamber is a check
on popular passions and thus on the possibility of majority tyranny.
“In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative
assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a ﬁrst, must be
3This fails to account for why there were typically only two chambers. In fact, until reforms in
the mid-nineteenth century, the Swedish Riksdag had four chambers. Tsebelis and Money, (1997,
29-30) report that from the ﬁfteenth century onward each chamber had a veto over decisions. In the
eighteenth century this was relaxed with decisions requiring the assent of three of the four chambers.
The 1865-66 creation of a two-chamber parliament is suggested by them to be the result of ”the
unwieldiness of decision making with four estates rather than by demands for electoral reform.”
4The author is believed to be either Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, but there is no
deﬁnitive attribution.
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in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security
to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in
schemes of usurpation or perﬁdy, where the ambition or corruption of
one would otherwise be suﬃcient” (Federalist #62, 403).
Riker (1992), too, emphasizes the control of majority tyranny, claiming that a
bicameral structure is more appropriate than other devices. He concedes, however,
that other constitutional features accomplish this purpose – a unitary legislature with
a supermajority decision rule, an independent executive, proportional representation
(diminishing the likelihood of a single majority party), judicial veto power – but
presents deﬁciencies in each relative to bicameralism (which we take up in the next
section).
The second claim for bicameralism from Hamilton and Madison revolves around
the virtues of delay. Numerous bodies, like most lower chambers, are subject to
sudden impulses that less numerous bodies are able to check through deliberation and
patience. Members of the lower chamber may, given their short terms, be impulsive
and prone to quick ﬁxes to problems that would better yield to a more deliberative
and considered treatment. Thus, the combination of smaller size and longer terms
provides the Senate with the inclination toward delay. Of course it should be observed
that, as advocates for the Constitution, Hamilton and Madison did not balance their
analysis with an assessment of the costs of delay, or what today would be called
gridlock.
Nevertheless, as also emphasized by Riker (1992) and Levmore (1992), bicameralism
renders change more diﬃcult than unicameralism. Their argument is that it takes
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longer to broker a deal to change the status quo because acceptible changes are
harder to ﬁnd in a bicameral arrangement than in a unicameral one.5 As a corollary of
delaying change by making it more diﬃcult, bicameralism also reduces the prospect of
arbitrary change, something that is more problematical for multidimensional decisions
in a simple majority-rule institution with no Condorcet winner.6
A third rationale for bicameralism oﬀered up by Hamilton and Madison is related
to agent types on the one hand, and the speciﬁc tasks often performed by upper
chambers on the other. They observe:
“It is not possible that an assembly of men called for the most part
from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short
time, and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public
occupation to a study of the laws, the aﬀairs, and the comprehensive
interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape
a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust”
(Federalist #62, 404).
By contrast, politicians with longer terms are in a position to accumulate substan-
tive expertise and human capital relevant to governing. Thus, it should come as no
5Let x0 be the status quo in a multidimensional policy space. Deﬁne W (x0) as the set of al-
ternatives preferred to x0 by any decisive coalition in a unitary legislature – the winset of x0.
Let Wi(x0), i = H,S be the chamber-speciﬁc winsets of a House and Senate. The claim is:
WH(x0) ∩WS(x0) ⊂W (x0).
6Cutrone and McCarty (2006) demonstrate, as a positive claim (with no normative justiﬁcation),
that bicameralism produces a gridlock region that renders the status quo more robust to minor
electoral perturbations than is the case in a unicameral arrangement.
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surprise that upper chambers frequently have responsibility to review and revise the
work of the lower chamber. Indeed, in many upper chambers they may only review
and revise matters related to the raising of revenue. In eﬀect, the second chamber
provides a second opinion. (And, in those political systems where power has shifted
dramatically to the lower chamber, the upper chamber is often restricted to a role of
review and revision for all legislation.)
Fourth, and related, the authors of The Federalist regarded stability in policy and
in government as a virtue. “No government, any more than an individual, will long
be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without pos-
sessing a certain portion of order and stability” (Federalist #62, 407). Longer terms
for the upper chamber mean more experienced members, a more stable membership,
and a greater willingness to think long term.
Fifth, Hamilton and Madison further emphasize time horizon and limited discount-
ing of the future associated with the upper chamber. The lower chamber, given their
shorter leash, is bound to be focused on the short term. So, while frequent elections
maintain popular control over politicians, they have a dark side. A second chamber,
on a diﬀerent and lengthier electoral calendar, is a partial corrective. They note that
“the proper remedy for [a short-term oriented lower chamber] must be an additional
body in the legislative department, which, having suﬃcient permanency to provide for
such objects as require a continued attention, and a train of measures, may be justly
and eﬀectually answerable for the attainment of those objects” (Federalist #63, 409,
emphasis added).
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We have presented the liberal canon of justiﬁcations for bicameralism – repre-
sentational diversity, checks on majority tyranny, the virtues of delay, the need for
experienced and knowledgeable legislative politicians while not sacriﬁcing proximity
to popular sentiments, the beneﬁts of review and revision, stability of the political
class, and longer time horizons and a willingness to devote energy to “such objects
as require a continued attention.” The justiﬁcations are suggestive . . . up to a point.
They demonstrate why a single legislative chamber may be at a disadvantage, but
they justify neither why a second chamber is suﬃcient nor, in failing to explore alter-
native remedies, whether it is necessary. We turn to some of the modeling literature
for views on these issues.
3. Modeling Literature
3.1. Bicameralism. There are many models of legislatures and their internal ar-
rangements, but few take up the issue of bicameralism. Indeed, most political econ-
omy models include a legislature that looks either like the US House of Representa-
tives with its elaborate internal structure and nuanced procedures, or like a conti-
nental lower chamber with a cabinet supported (typically) by a multiparty coalition.
Explicit treatments of bicameralism are rare.
Riker (1992) attempts to provide insights about bicameralism developed from more
formal considerations.7 Riker is obsessed with majority preference cycles. Their very
existence means that majority decisions are arbitrary and can only be arrived at by
7One of the earliest treatments is Buchanan and Tullock (1962).
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contrivance (e.g., agenda manipulation). Since they almost always exist in multi-
dimensional policy spaces, Riker concludes that simple majority decision making is
tyrannical, precisely the worry expressed about unicameral legislatures in The Feder-
alist. He then explores, mainly via abstract examples, how several institutions might
alleviate this condition. If, in a multidimensional set up, the winset of any status
quo is non-empty under simple majority rule, the winset for that status quo under
a supermajority criterion is nested within the simple majority winset. This, Riker
claims, ameliorates majority tyranny and increases the prospects for delay. Likewise,
he shows that the intersecting winsets of multiple chambers have a similar eﬀect.8
However, and this is his “pitch” for bicameralism, unidimensional decisions, in which
single-peaked preferences assure the absence of preference cycles and the existence
of a majority-rule optimum, are handled more eﬀectively by bicameral arrangements
than any of his other proposed institutions.
“So we have reached the new normative justiﬁcation of bicameralism.
As against unicameralism, bicameralism works to minimize majority
tyranny. As against other methods of delay, it allows majority decision
when an unequivocal majority choice exists. Thus it captures the ad-
vantages and avoids the disadvantages of the method of majority rule”
(Riker, 1992, 113).9
8As a third institution, he suggests that the mulitpartism produced by proportional represen-
tation, even in a unicameral chamber, has similarities to both multicameralism and supermajority
rule.
9Riker makes a number of simplifying assumptions. He assumes, for example, that the distri-
butions of legislative preferences are identical in both chambers. As Cutrone and McCarty (2006)
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Levmore (1992) is also obsessed by preference cycles under simple majority rule
and the opportunities for mischief this aﬀords an agenda setter (or head of a majority
party) in a unicameral legislative body. The advantage of bicameralism he identiﬁes
has to do with the sequencing of votes when two bodies must concur. An agenda
setter is one chamber may well be able to sequence votes to obtain a result he desires.
But if that result must then be considered by a second chamber whose agenda setter
has objectives of her own, then the ﬁrst agenda setter’s leverage is reduced – “At
the very least, if the two chambers consider an issue simultaneously, one chamber’s
agenda setter will be at the mercy of the order of consideration in the second chamber.
Bicameralism can thus be understood as an antidote to the manipulative power of
the convenor, or agenda setter, when faced with cycling preferences” (Levmore, 1992,
147-148).
The arguments of Riker and Levmore are casual, driven mainly by example, and
seem contrived to some (see Tsebelis and Money, 1997, Chapter 9). They seek to
justify bicameralism. Most of the modeling literature, on the other hand, seeks to
trace the implications of bicameralism. We will be brief in describing some of these
results.
It is well known that the existence of a non-empty majority core in a multidimen-
sional spatial model is a zero-probability event. Hammond and Miller (1987) show
conditions that produce a non-empty bicameral core – the set of points that cannot
show, even in a unidimensional world, when this assumption is relaxed there is a gridlock region
between the medians of the two chambers. So, the advantages attributed by Riker to bicameralism
are not terribly robust.
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be defeated by concurrent majorities in both chambers.10 Tsebelis and Money (1997)
employ cooperative game theory concepts (core, yolk, uncovered set), like Hammond
and Miller, to identify bicameral equilibria under conditions of bargaining between
the chambers. They explore Rubinstein-Baron-Ferejohn bargaining between agents
of the two chambers (as in a conference or navette procedure). Both moral hazard
and impatience ﬁgure in this.11 In a more general framework, Diermeier and Myer-
son (1999) provide an elegant treatment of ”strategic” organizational design. Taking
constitutional features as given – unicameral or multicameral legislature, whether
there is an independent executive, distribution of agenda and veto power across con-
stitutional players – they examine how a chamber will strategicaly arrange its own
internal organization in order to accomplish chamber-speciﬁc goals.12 Their general
approach is very appealing for it accommodates a variety of ways in which “hurdles”
10In eﬀect, the requirement is that there is clear “separation” between the preference distributions
of the two chambers. That is, the majority winsets of the two chambers must have an empty
intersection – an implausible condition.
11Moral hazard is of interest because bargaining agents need not be “representative” of their par-
ent chamber. Gailmard and Hammond (2006), for example, explore the ways in which intercameral
bargaining has intracameral organizational consequences – in particular, that a chamber might wish
to “tie its hands” by appointing a biased committee to bargain on its behalf. Impatience is of interest
because it connects to the diﬀering term structures of the two chambers of a bicameral legislature.
In the US, for example, the Senate might be thought the more patient body, since two-thirds of its
members do not face their voters at the next election. In models of the Rubinstein variety, patience
has its bargaining advantages.
12Theirs is a vote-buying model in which politicians shake down interest groups for bribes and
campaign contributions. Members of each chamber seek to arrange intracameral structures and
procedures, taking other constitutional arrangements as ﬁxed, to enable them to extract as much
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may be put in place, ranging from disciplined legislative parties to committee systems
to committee chairs with veto power to strong ﬂoor leaders. This enables comparisons
across nominally diﬀerent organizational features in terms of the hurdles they imply
and thus the extraction capabilities from special interests they constitute.
3.2. Staggered Terms. In every treatment of bicameralism with which we are famil-
iar, there is no recognition of the near-universal regularity that membership conditions
vary across the chambers. For example, nearly all lower chambers are elected. Of
the 72 two-chamber legislatures identiﬁed on the French Senat web site in 2000 on
the other hand, 36 have fully elected upper chambers, 18 are partially elected, and 18
are fully appointed. Eighteen percent have term lengths of four years, 31% have ﬁve
years, 24% six years, 7% more than six years, and the remainder are mixed. Lower
chambers on the other hand tend to have shorter term lengths (whether ﬁxed or deter-
mined endogenously by the discretionary calling of elections). Bicameral chambers,
in short, are not copies of each other.
Of special interest to us in the present paper is the fact that many upper chambers
not only have longer terms than lower chambers; they also do not “fully renew”
themselves at each election occasion. One third of the members of the US Senate, for
example, face renewal of their six year terms every two years. This means that while
all members of the lower chamber are “in cycle” every election – this is the deﬁning
property of a simultaneous-term legislature – only a third of senators are. This, in
as possible. This involves creating intra-institutional hurdles optimally so as to encourage maxi-
mum contributions from special interests, making sure the hurdles are not so high to discourage
contributions.
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turn, means that in intra-chamber politics, senators may condition on each other’s
location in the electoral cycle, something simultaneous-term lower-chamber members
cannot do.
Alas there are virtually no models of bicameralism incorporating diﬀerential mem-
bership conditions across chambers.13 The model that we develop in the present paper
addresses some of these micro-features.
4. Theoretical Features of the Baseline Model
In order to focus attention initially on some of the core features of our framework
and establish a few of our main points in as simple a set-up as possible, we ﬁrst study a
baseline model with two restrictive features, one concerning the economic environment
and the other concerning the legislative structure. With respect to the former, we
assume that in each period there is an exogenously given, ﬁxed economic surplus,
or cake, to be allocated as pork across political districts. Thus, we suppress the
underlying, general ﬁscal policy problem of taxation (that determines the size of the
cake) and its allocation between district-speciﬁc amounts of pork and national public
goods. With respect to the latter, we assume that if there are two (or more) chambers
in the legislature, then they are identical except possibly with respect to their term
structures. The extensions section considers somewhat richer environments.
13There are many empirical papers in the American politics literature that explore legislative
voting patterns, campaign practices, time allocations, etc. conditional on where in the electoral
cycle a senator is. Shepsle, Van Houweling, Abrams, and Hanson (2006), a study of divide-the-
dollar pork barreling activities among senators, cites some of these papers.
BICAMERALISM 19
4.1. Term Structure. We consider an inﬁnitely-lived legislature which is founded
in period −1. At that time the “founding fathers” jointly determine and commit
to various elements of its institutional structure, as described in section 4.5. At
this constitutional moment, there are no legislators present. The legislature starts
operating from period 0 onwards. In each period t (where t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .) there are
two legislators in a chamber (of either a unicameral or a bicameral legislature), each
elected from a separate electoral district.14
We will begin our analysis with a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature (in
which both legislators come up for reelection in the same period), and then compare
it to a staggered-term unicameral legislature (in which the two legislators come up
for reelection at diﬀerent dates). In the context of our baseline model, this will prove
pretty straightforward to do but it will illustrate some of the calculations at work,
and allow us to zero-in on the importance of the determination and allocation of
agenda power (formally captured by recognition probabilities). We then study the
more interesting case of a bicameral legislature. A main aim in this part of the
14There are several restrictive features built into this baseline set-up, which we initially adopt so
as to allow us to focus attention on a few core points. In the extensions section we discuss several
modiﬁcations. We raise the issue of the “optimal” number of chambers when more than two can be
selected. It will be argued that frictions of various kinds arise as more chambers are added to the
legislature, some of which can create costly gridlock. We explore the robustness of our results when
in a bicameral legislature the two chambers are interlocked in the sense that to pass legislation the
approval of both chambers (as is the case in many bicameral legislatures) is required. Finally we
raise the prospect of allowing for a richer, and more plausible composition of the legislature which
would involve chambers having diﬀerent numbers of legislators and diﬀerent bases of representation.
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analysis is to explore the circumstances, if any, under which a bicameral legislature is
preferred (and hence selected by the founding fathers at the constitutional moment)
over a unicameral legislature.
Our model of elections is described in subsection 4.2. The policy context in each
period concerns the sharing of an economic surplus. We stylize this as the allocation
of a cake of unit size between the two districts. In the context of a unicameral
legislature, the two legislators negotiate over the partition of this whole cake. But in
a bicameral setting each of the two chambers independently divides half of the cake.15
Note that the legislative task is exclusively one of distribution. There are no public
goods in this baseline model, and the surplus is treated as exogenous. The bargaining
procedure (which in particular embodies the distribution of proposal power between
the legislators within a chamber) is described in subsection 4.3. If an agreement is
struck, then the agreed shares of the cake ﬂow to the districts. The legislators receive
no direct beneﬁt from any portion of this cake. A legislator simply receives a ﬁxed
payoﬀ b > 0 in each term he serves in oﬃce. Any share of the cake that he negotiates
for his district, however, may help his reelection prospects.
4.2. Elections. The likelihood of a legislator being reelected depends on a variety of
factors. Even when such factors are taken into account, some uncertainty about the
15It would be useful to consider alternative procedures through which the unit-size cake is parti-
tioned, including procedures in which one chamber proposes an allocation while the other chamber
decides on whether or not to approve it. Such procedures would mean that the two chambers are
interlocked and connected, and do not operate independently. The extensions section studies an
extended set-up in which some policy (tax rates) are determined “jointly” by the two chambers.
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election outcome remains. Let Π therefore denote the probability that an arbitrary
legislator (in an arbitrary period) is reelected. We explicitly incorporate a key idea
about this probability of being reelected, the notion of retrospective voting (Fiorina,
1981). Voters care about the legislator’s past performance in oﬃce when deciding
whether or not to reelect him. We formalize this idea by positing that Π depends
on the amounts of cake he obtained for his constituents during his most recent term
of oﬃce. When that term consists of two periods, then we write this as Π(x1, x2),
where x1 and x2 are the amounts of cake obtained by the legislator during the ﬁrst
and second periods, respectively, in his most recent two-period term of oﬃce. And
when the term of oﬃce consists of a single period, then we write this simply as Π(x).
It is natural to assume that receiving more cake does not make a voter worse oﬀ,
and thus does not decrease a legislator’s chances of getting reelected. However, it
may be that for some increases, the chances are unaﬀected. Hence:
Assumption 1 (Weak Monotonicity). The probability Π that a legislator is reelected
is non-decreasing in its argument(s).
In summary, our model of elections comes in reduced form and is characterized
by the probability-of-reelection function Π satisfying Assumption 1 (A1 henceforth).
Thus, the probability-of-reelection function is exogenously given (i.e., in particular
the voting rule and voter behaviour are not explicitly modelled).16
16It may be noted that Π could alternatively be interpreted as the probability of reappointment
by, say, a state legislature, as was the case in the nineteenth century US.
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4.3. Bargaining Power. The procedural rules that inﬂuence the determination of
the negotiated partition of the cake are a key part of the institutional structure of
the legislature, pinning down the allocation of power (proposal power in particular)
between the two legislators. Our framework abstracts from many of the details of real
institutions through which power is derived (such as membership on committees or
ﬂoor leadership positions), capturing the allocation of bargaining power in a simple
manner.
For each chamber, we posit a random proposer, “take-it-or-leave-it-oﬀer” format.
Let θi ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with which the legislator from district i (i = 1, 2)
is recognized, and makes an oﬀer of a partition of the cake that the chamber in
question has available, where θ1+θ2 = 1. If the oﬀer is accepted, agreement is struck.
But if the oﬀer is rejected, then bargaining terminates, no agreement is reached, and
no cake is obtained (in the period in question) by either district from this chamber.
The recognition probabilities can depend on several factors including the following:
(i) the population size of the two districts, with the larger-sized district possessing
higher recognition probability (which capture the notion that larger-sized districts
have a larger number of legislators), (ii) the seniority of the legislators (with for
example recognition probability increasing with seniority), and (iii) in the case of a
staggered-term chamber, the positions of the legislators in the ”electoral cycle” (with
recognition probabilities in a period increasing with proximity to the election date).
We adopt the convention that an oﬀer designates the share going to the proposer.
It is therefore convenient to use the word “demand” rather than “oﬀer”. We adopt
the following regularity assumptions:
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Assumption 2 (Tie-Breaking). (i) When indiﬀerent between accepting or rejecting
a demand, a legislator accepts it. (ii) When indiﬀerent between making one of several
demands, a legislator selects the one which allocates the largest share of the cake to
him.
For future reference, it may be noted that the expected payoﬀ to a legislator who
is reelected on each occasion with a constant probability π ∈ [0, 1) equals b/(1− π).
Notice that, without much loss of generality, we do not endow legislators with a
discount factor.17
4.4. Informational Structure. How much information does any legislator have in
any given period about the history of play? The issue is especially pertinent here
since every legislator faces reelection, and with positive probability he is replaced by
a newly minted legislator. While the legislature is an inﬁnitely-lived body, operating
over an indeﬁnite number of periods, legislators come and go. As such a legislator
may not know all of the important or relevant bits of the history of play at any given
period. In this chapter, we posit a default information regime, one in which legislators
have imperfect information about the history of play:
17To be precise, there is a potential but minor loss of generality. By not entertaining discounting,
we need to assume that the reelection probability never takes the value of one. While such an
assumption seems quite plausible, it does however rule out the cut-oﬀ voting rules used in the
political agency literature (Barro, 1972; Ferejohn, 1986) in which a legislator is reelected with
probability one if he performs suﬃciently well (and fails to get reelected otherwise). The reelection
probability function Π can of course approximate such a cut-oﬀ rule. We have chosen to proceed as
we have in order to avoid carrying around an extra parameter (a discount factor for the legislators).
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Assumption 3 (Imperfect Information). For any t there exists a ﬁnite T > t such
that legislators in period T and onwards do not know of the actions taken by the
legislators in periods s ≤ t.
This formalization of imperfect information is implied by agents with ﬁnite memory;
the length can vary across legislators. Assumption 3 implies that information about
a past action is lost for sure some ﬁnite number of periods in the future.18
An altogether diﬀerent kind of information concerns what a legislator knows about
the game form, the payoﬀs and various parameters. Throughout this paper we adopt
the complete information assumption: i.e., there is common knowledge amongst all
legislators about the game itself.
4.5. Founding Fathers’ Problem. At the constitutional moment in period −1, the
founding fathers select the institutional structure of the legislature. In particular, they
jointly choose (a) chamber structure (unicameral or bicameral), (b) term structure
(simultaneous, staggered, or mixed), and (c) the allocation of proposal power (recog-
nition probabilities in each chamber). These features are institutionalized through
appropriate constitutional mechanisms, which determine legislative procedures and
rules.
The choices are made so as to optimize over the founding fathers’ joint interests.
We assume that the founding fathers respectively represent the interests of the two
districts, and that for each district, the voters across time have the same preferences.
We can therefore identify one inﬁnitely-lived principal per district. Let ui(c) denote
18This formalization of imperfect information is adapted from Bhaskar (1998) who studies a
version of Samuelson’s OLG model with imperfect information.
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the per-period utility obtained by the principal from district i (i = 1, 2) when her
consumption is c in the period in question, and let δi < 1 denote the per-period
discount factor used by her to discount future utility. We assume that ui is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in c. The latter feature captures the notion that the
principals (voters, citizens) are strictly risk-averse.
4.6. Comparisons. Our main objective is to compare and contrast the properties of
the equilibrium outcomes in legislatures with one or two chambers consisting of agents
serving under a staggered-term or simultaneous-term structure. For a simultaneous-
term legislature, a term consists of one period with an election taking place at the
end of the period. In contrast, a term of oﬃce in a staggered-term body consists of
two periods with elections taking place at the end of every period. The important
diﬀerence is that both simultaneous-term legislators face election each period, whereas
only one of the staggered-term legislators faces election each period.
A staggered-term legislator is denoted as EARLY when he is in the ﬁrst period of
his two-period term of oﬃce, and LATE when he is in the second (and ﬁnal) period
of his two-period term of oﬃce. In each period t ≥ 0, therefore, one legislator is
EARLY and the other LATE, and it is the period-t LATE legislator who comes up
for reelection at the end of this period. If reelected, he becomes the period-(t + 1)
EARLY legislator, while the period-t EARLY legislator becomes the period-(t + 1)
LATE legislator. If, on the other hand, the period-t LATE legislator loses his election
bid, then a new legislator is the period (t + 1)-EARLY legislator.19
19The equilibria of this staggered-term legislature have been studied in Muthoo and Shepsle
(2006).
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It is assumed that in a simultaneous-term chamber proposal power is conditioned
only on the name of the district; thus the district i legislator is recognized each period
to make a proposal with probability θi; in every period this is i ’s recognition proba-
bility. Alternatively, in the staggered-term legislature proposal power is conditioned
on the district name and the legislator’s type: θiE and θiL respectively denote the
probabilities with which the legislator from district i (i = 1, 2) makes the take-it-or-
leave-it oﬀer when he is EARLY and LATE, where θiE + θjL = 1 (j = i). Thus, i ’s
recognition probability can possibly alternate from period to period according to his
period-speciﬁc type. As noted earlier, recognition probabilities will typically depend
on other factors such as legislative seniority, with more senior legislators possessing
relatively greater agenda power and hence a larger recognition probability. We will
discuss below how our results would alter when account is taken of such factors.
This completes the description of the theoretical features of our basic framework.
They deﬁne a stochastic game with a countably inﬁnite number of agents, but only
two agents (per chamber) are active in any one period, and the number of periods for
which an agent is active is determined endogenously.20
20Our stochastic game falls outside of the classes of stochastic games studied in the current
literature (see, for example, Friedman 1986, Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, and Dutta 1995). Thus, we
cannot appeal to or apply results from that literature. However, some of our main results are derived
using methods and ideas borrowed from that literature and from the theory of inﬁnitely-repeated
games.
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4.7. Preliminary Results: Sequentially Rational Equilibria. The imperfect
information assumption, A3, implies that there are no proper subgames in our dy-
namic, stochastic game. As such we cannot use the subgame perfect equilibrium
concept. But, as is now well-established, it is desirable to work nonetheless with a
solution concept that embodies the general notion of sequential rationality, which is
the central element of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept. In the context of
our stochastic game, the sequential rationality concept requires that in any period t
and for any observed history, each legislator’s actions are ex-post optimal (i.e., they
maximize his expected payoﬀ from that period onwards). We deﬁne a sequentially
rational, symmetric pure strategy equilibrium (henceforth equilibrium) to be a pure-
strategy, adopted by all legislators, which is sequentially rational.21 We now state a
main result concerning the structure of equilibria:
Proposition 1 (Structure of Equilibria). Fix the institutional choices made by the
founding fathers in period −1. Any pure-strategy equilibrium of the subgame starting
from period 0 is a Markov pure strategy.
Proof. In the appendix. 
21To simplify the formal analysis, we assume that the legislators in period t know the amount
of cake the period-t LATE legislator obtained in period t − 1 (which comprises the payoﬀ-relevant
bits of the history at the beginning of period t in those cases when legislators have two-period terms
of oﬃce); note this means that T in A3 is strictly greater than t + 1. Given this, we do not need
to invoke any beliefs regarding past actions in deﬁning and implementing this equilibrium concept.
For example, we do not need to employ the relatively more complex sequential equilibrium concept.
Our adopted solution concept is essentially the same as used in Bhaskar (1998).
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This remarkable and unexpected result implies that with imperfect information
about the history of play, there cannot exist equilibria in which a legislator uses a
non-Markov (history dependent) pure strategy; that is, any pure strategy in which
a legislator conditions his current actions on payoﬀ-irrelevant past actions cannot be
part of an equilibrium. This means, for example, that intertemporal cooperation is
not sustainable in equilibrium.
We have formalized the notion of imperfect information about history in a par-
ticular manner, as deﬁned in A3. As noted earlier, this would be satisﬁed if, for
example, legislators have ﬁnite memory. The method of proof of Proposition 1 relies
crucially on the implied feature that information about an action in period t is lost for
sure after a ﬁnite number of periods; this allows us to deploy a backward induction
argument to establish that equilibrium actions in any period after t + 1 cannot be
conditioned on period-t actions. While ﬁnite memory would seem to be a relatively
reasonable assumption, it would be interesting to know whether or not the conclusion
of Proposition 1 is robust to alternative formalizations of imperfect information, such
as when information is lost gradually and stochastically (for example, because each
legislator knows the full history from the point at which he is ﬁrst elected into the
legislature).22
22It may be noted that any reﬁnement of our equilibrium concept will not, by deﬁnition, sustain
non-Markov equilibria involving intertemporal cooperation. Proposition 1 only requires that players’
strategies respect the standard notion of sequential rationality.
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Given Proposition 1, the set of pure-strategy equilibria is identical to the set of
pure-strategy equilibria in Markov strategies. The following proposition characterizes
the unique such equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (Unique Markov Equilibrium, ME). Fix the institutional choices made
by the founding fathers in period −1. In the unique pure-strategy ME of the subgame
beginning in period 0, a legislator always agrees to any proposed demand, and when
controlling the agenda always demands the whole cake.
Proof. In the appendix. 
Given these equilibrium consequences of any set of institutional choices made by the
founding fathers in period −1, we now turn to characterize the payoﬀ consequences
to them of each possible set of choices, and then assess the relative merits of each
such choice.
5. Unicameral Legislatures: Results
Without loss of generality in what follows, we normalize the utility of principal i,
setting ui(1) = 1 and ui(0) = 0. Strict concavity implies that for any x ∈ (0, 1),
ui(x) > x, a fact we use in the analysis below. We begin with unicameral legislatures
where in each period the two legislators have the opportunity to partition a unit-size
cake.
First, we consider a unicameral, simultaneous-term chamber. Proposition 2 implies
that a legislator will demand in any period the entire unit-size cake when recognized
to make a proposal, and will accept any proposal made to him when his counterpart
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is recognized. Thus, the representative citizen in district i (hereafter, principal i) will
receive a sequence of 1s and 0s over time, sometimes securing the entire cake and
other times getting none of it. Her Bellman equation is USi = θi + δU
S
i , and hence,
(1) USi =
θi
1− δ ,
where USi is the equilibrium discounted present value of principal i’s payoﬀs under
a unicameral simultaneous-term institutional arrangement. (U is the mnemonic for
“unicameral.” The superscript identiﬁes the chamber as simultaneous-term.)
Computing the present value for principal i when her representative serves in a
staggered-term legislature requires a bit more development as the legislator’s recog-
nition probability depends on his district and period-dependent type. Assume that
as part of the constitutional determination at t = −1, one district is randomly de-
noted EARLY at t = 0, 2, 4, . . . and the other as EARLY at t = 1, 3, 5, . . .. We may
now compute two Bellman equations for each principal – one for UStiE and another for
UStiL . These stand for the ex ante value to principal i at t = 0, depending on whether
her district begins with the EARLY legislator or the LATE legislator respectively,
under the unicameral staggered-term arrangement. From the assumption of random
assignment of types, it follows that the present value for each district is simply the
arithmetic average of the EARLY and LATE payoﬀs USti = [U
St
iE + U
St
iL ]/2.
Proposition 2 implies that the period-t EARLY principal, say principal i, will enjoy
the entire cake with probability θiE and thus the period-t LATE principal, principal
j, will enjoy it with complementary probability, θjL = 1 − θiE. This implies the
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following Bellman equations for each principal:
UStiE = θiE + δ[θiL + δU
St
iE ]→ UStiE = [θiE + δθiL]/(1− δ2)
UStiL = θiL + δ[θiE + δU
St
iL ]→ UStiL = [θiL + δθiE]/(1− δ2).
Random assignment of EARLY and LATE to districts 1 and 2 imply
(2) USti =
UStiE + U
St
iL
2
=
θiE + θiL
2(1− δ) .
Comparing (1) and (2), we note that in the absence of any frictions or constraints on
parameter values, the payoﬀ consequences of a unicameral staggered-term legislature
can be replicated by a unicameral simultaneous-term legislature, and vice-versa, by
setting θi = (θiE + θiL)/2. Thus, in the (literal) context of the baseline model, the
founding fathers should, in period −1, be indiﬀerent between these two legislative
term structures, given that choice is restricted to a unicameral legislature.23
But that would be a mistaken conclusion to arrive at in general, as this conclusion
has been deduced from a baseline model that contains some restrictive features. This
can be illustrated with a substantive extension to the baseline model. Suppose legisla-
tive experience is explicitly modelled (by for example the numbers of previous terms
of oﬃce held by an incumbent legislator), and average experience positively aﬀects
the size of the cake available to the legislators — since it is plausible that a chamber
with more experienced legislators is able to secure a larger-sized cake from the same
set of resources (”more bang for the buck”). But how does that aﬀect the conclusion
23If the two legislators are treated equally, so that recognition probability depends only on a
legislator’s location in the electoral cycle, then θ1E = θ2E . Since θiE + θjL = 1, equation (2)
becomes USti = 1/2(1− δ).
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that the principals, when restricted to select a unicameral legislature, are indiﬀerent
between adopting a simultaneous-term structure and a staggered-term structure?
The fundamental diﬀerence between these two term structures is that in one struc-
ture all legislators are up for reelection in the same period (simultaneous-term), while
in the other structure not all legislators are up for reelection in the same period
(staggered-term). This key diﬀerence generates (potentially substantive) diﬀerences
in expected legislative experience in the chamber. In our two-legislators-per-chamber
setting, for example, consider the simultaneous-term chamber ﬁrst. With positive
probability both incumbent legislators will be defeated in any given period, and
hence both legislators in the subsequent period will be newly minted ones. This
implies a complete absence of legislative experience in the chamber. However, such
a scenario is impossible in a staggered-term chamber. Consequently, when allowing
for the size of the cake to be increasing in legislative experience, a staggered-term
unicameral legislature should have an advantage from the principals’ perspective over
a simultaneous-term unicameral legislature. This, of course, was one of the virtues of
a “partially renewed” chamber cited by Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist.
Another factor suggests that principals, at the constitutional moment, might pre-
fer a staggered-term unicameral legislature to a simultaneous-term unicameral al-
ternative: the former structure facilitates commitment to probabilistic alternation
of agenda-setting powers between the two districts by making recognition likelihood
type-dependent, a form of insurance preferred by risk-averse principals. We elaborate
on this below.
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We state one of the messages of this section informally since we have not elaborated
our model in order to prove this as a result:
If restricted to select a unicameral legislature at the constitutional mo-
ment, there are circumstances under which founding fathers would
choose one with a staggered-term structure rather than one with a
simultaneous-term structure.
6. Bicameral Legislatures: Results
In the baseline model the bicameral setting has two chambers each independently
dividing half a cake. The payoﬀ to a district is simply the sum of the chamber de-
cisions. There are three cases to examine: (i) both chambers simultaneous-term;
(ii) both chambers staggered-term; (iii) one simultaneous-term chamber and one
staggered-term chamber.24
6.1. Two Simultaneous-Term Chambers. Deﬁne BSSi as the present value to
district i of the ﬂow of cake from two simultaneous-term chambers each allocating
one half a cake. (B is the mnemonic for ”bicameral.” The superscript identiﬁes both
of the chambers as simultaneous-term.) With probability θ2i principal i’s agent will
be recognized in both chambers and receive the entire half-cake from each (following
from Proposition 2). With probability (1− θi)2 she will receive no cake at all. And
24In case (ii) we will assume that the staggers are independently determined at t=-1. Thus,
district i’s agent begins EARLY in both chambers, LATE in both chambers, EARLY in the ﬁrst
chamber and LATE in the second, and LATE in the ﬁrst chamber and EARLY in the second with
equal probability.
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with probability θi(1 − θi) she will receive half a cake from one chamber and none
from the other (and this can occur in either of two ways). Thus,
(3) BSSi = θ
2
i + 2θi(1− θi)ui(1/2) + δBSSi → BSSi =
θ2i + 2θi(1− θi)ui(1/2)
1− δ .
A comparison of (1) and (3) veriﬁes for each i that:
(4) BSSi > U
S
i ,
since ui is strictly concave.
25 Thus the bicameral legislature with both chambers
operating under the simultaneous-term structure Pareto dominates (for the two prin-
cipals) the unicameral legislature with the simultaneous-term structure. Since, as
established above, principals are indiﬀerent between simultaneous- and staggered-
term structures when restricted to the choice of a unicameral legislature, we have the
following result:
Proposition 3. In the baseline model, at the constitutional moment the principals
will select a bicameral legislature over a unicameral legislature.
While the Pareto-dominance of the bicameral simultaneous-term legislature over
the unicameral legislature of either term structure is established, we cannot yet say
which term structures should operate in the bicameral setting until we determine
the payoﬀ consequences in the other two possible cases (all staggered and mixed).
But before we turn to that, we provide some intuition for the result contained in
Proposition 3.
25The result also requires that 0 < θi < 1; that is, we rule out the possibility that either district
has all the agenda power.
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At the heart of the result lies the fact that principals are risk averse, and bicam-
eralism, as modelled in our baseline model, reduces risk because it allows for the
possibility that the agenda setters in the two chambers are diﬀerent. If principal i’s
legislator in one chamber does not get proposal power in a particular legislative ses-
sion, maybe her legislator in the other chamber will. This means that bicameralism
– with two chambers each controling the distribution of half a cake each period –
provides better insurance for principals against getting nothing.26
6.2. Two Staggered-Term Chambers. Deﬁne BStStiEE as the present value to dis-
trict i of a two-staggered-term-chamber bicameral arrangement where i’s agent is
EARLY in both. Deﬁne BStStiLL and B
StSt
iEL = B
StSt
iLE in a similar fashion. (The super-
script identiﬁes the arrangement as staggered-term in each chamber and the subscript
identiﬁes i’s agent type in each chamber.) We obtain:
BStStiEE ={θ2iE + 2θiE(1− θiE)ui(1/2) + δ[θ2iL + 2θiL(1− θiL)ui(1/2)]}/(1− δ2)
BStStiEL =B
StSt
iLE =
[
(1 + δ)
(
θiEθiL + [θiE(1− θiL) + (1− θiE)θiL]ui(1/2)
)]
/(1− δ2)
BStStiLL ={θ2iL + 2θiL(1− θiL)ui(1/2) + δ[θ2iE + 2θiE(1− θiE)ui(1/2)]}/(1− δ2).
Summing these expressions (the second one twice), simplifying, and dividing by four,
we obtain
(5) BStSti =
θ̂2i + 2θ̂i(2− θ̂i)ui(1/2)
4(1− δ) , where
26One might then wonder why we actually observe unicameral legislatures in many circumstances.
That is, what weighs against the insurance advantages of bicameralism? We take up this extension
in section 7.
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θ̂i = θiE + θiL.
27 From (2) and (5) it is easy to verify for each i that (since ui(1/2) >
1/2):
(6) BStSti > U
St
i .
Consequently, we have established that principal i prefers the bicameral legislature
with both chambers operating under the staggered-term structure over a unicameral
staggered-term legislature. By the same argument as the one establishing the Pareto
dominance of the bicameral simultaneous-term legislature over unicameral legislatures
of either term structure (and hence Proposition 3), it follows that the bicameral
staggered-term legislature Pareto dominates unicameral legislatures of either term
structure.
Before proceeding further, we would like to note that the extent to which the
bicameral staggered-term legislature is preferred by principal i over the unicameral
staggered-term legislature strictly increases in her degree of risk aversion. More pre-
cisely, the diﬀerence BStSti −USti is directly proportional to the diﬀerence ui(1/2)−1/2.
Indeed, the “risk reduction” force is at work here as well.
6.3. A Simultaneous-Term Chamber and a Staggered-Term Chamber. De-
ﬁne BSStiE as the present value to district i of a bicameral arrangement in which i’s
agent in the staggered-term chamber begins as the EARLY type; BSStiL is the present
27It may be noted that while, by deﬁnition, θ̂1 + θ̂2 = 2, there is no reason why in general θ̂i = 1.
For example, it may be the case that LATE legislators receive higher agenda power than EARLY
ones, but at the same time agenda power is increasing in population size. It is thus possible that if
district i has a much smaller population that while θiL > θiE , it nonetheless is the case that θ̂i < 1.
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value when i’s agent begins as the LATE type. Given equal chances that i’s agent
will be of either type, BSSti = (B
SSt
iE + B
SSt
iL )/2.
From Proposition 2, recognition in a chamber for a district’s agent secures for
her the entire half-cake from that chamber. Thus, assuming each chamber operates
independently, the Bellman equations are
BSStiE = {θiθiE + [θi(1− θiE) + (1− θi)θiE]ui(1/2)}+ δ{θiθiL+
[θi(1− θiL) + (1− θi)θiL]ui(1/2)}+ δ2BSStiE .
BSStiL = {θiθiL + [θi(1− θiL) + (1− θi)θiL]ui(1/2)}+ δ{θiθiE+
[θi(1− θiE) + (1− θi)θiE]ui(1/2)}+ δ2BSStiL .
Summing, simplifying, and dividing by two we obtain
(7) BSSti =
BSStiE + B
SSt
iL
2
=
θiθ̂i + [θi(2− θ̂i) + (1− θi)θ̂i]ui(1/2)
2(1− δ) .
Proposition 3 established the payoﬀ dominance of bicameralism over unicameralism
(based on the “risk reduction” argument). Having now completed the derivation of
the payoﬀs to the principals from a bicameral legislature under the various alternative
term structures, one can in principle assess the relative merits of the three possible
kinds of bicameral legislatures. However, there are no general results to be obtained
here, as matters in part depend on exact parameter values.
One interesting set of parameter values are those when θi = θ̂i/2 (i = 1, 2); i.e.,
which capture the notion that agenda power in a staggered-term chamber is on average
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the same as in a simultaneous-term chamber. For such parameter values, we obtain
(via straightforward computations) for each i that
BStSti = B
SS
i = B
SSt
i > U
S
i = U
St
i ,
and hence:
Proposition 4. If the parameters are such that agenda power to legislators from each
district in a staggered-term chamber is to be the same on average as in a simultaneous-
term chamber, then the principals are indiﬀerent amongst the three possible bicameral
legislatures.
6.4. Summary and Discussion. Before we turn to study a few extensions of the
baseline model, we provide a summary of the main insights established above. Per-
haps the most important insight is the one contained in Proposition 3, namely, that
bicameralism Pareto dominates unicameralism. This result follows from the fact that
on the one hand bicameralism reduces risk and this beneﬁts risk-averse principals,
and on the other hand there are no costs of having an additional chamber (in the
baseline model). The greater the degree of risk-aversion, the larger is the beneﬁt
from bicameralism. However, once costs of having an additional chamber are taken
into account (see section 7.2 below), a unicameral legislature can be preferred by
the principals. In such circumstances, the principals may choose to operate the sin-
gle chamber under a staggered-term structure rather than a simultaneous-term one,
since, as noted above, that would provide for relatively greater legislative experience
in the chamber in every period.
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Given Proposition 3, we then established a few results concerning the relative merits
of the three possible kinds of bicameral legislature, relating to the term structures
of its two chambers. One point to emphasize is that in general it is not possible to
pin down which kind of bicameral legislature best serves the joint interests of the
principals. It depends on parameter values. However, we showed in Proposition 4
that for a class of parameter values, the principals’ are indiﬀerent amongst the three
possible kinds of bicameral legislatures.
7. Extensions
7.1. Risk-Reduction: A Benefit from Dividing Power. In a unicameral legis-
lature all power is concentrated in the hands of the members of a single chamber. In
contrast, in a bicameral legislature power is divided between members of two cham-
bers. What are the costs and beneﬁts of dividing power between two chambers of
a single legislature? To put it diﬀerently, what are the relative merits of unicamer-
alism versus bicameralism? In the baseline model above, we identiﬁed and focused
on one source of beneﬁt of bicameralism over unicameralism to the principals, which
is as follows. By dividing power between two chambers, there is the possibility of
two distinctive agenda-setters coexisting in each period. This, in turn, implies that
each district has a relatively greater chance of securing some legislative agenda power,
and this reduces the likelihood of receiving no (or little) cake in each period. Given
that the principals are risk-averse, the consequent reduction in risk aﬀorded by this
division of power is of strict beneﬁt to each principal.
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This logic of risk reduction extends beyond the comparative advantage of bicam-
eralism over unicameralism, since dividing power further reduces risk further. To
illustrate this point consider a legislature composed of three chambers all of which
operate under the simultaneous-term structure. We capture the division of power by
assuming that each chamber controls, and independently divides, one third of the
unit-size cake. Since Proposition 2 carries over to this context, the ex ante expected
payoﬀ to principal i under simultaneous-term tricameralism is
(8) T SSSi =
3θi(1− θi)2ui(1/3) + 3θ2i (1− θi)ui(2/3) + θ3i
1− δi .
Using (3), we obtain, after some simpliﬁcation (and assuming that 0 < θi < 1), that
T SSSi  BSSi ⇐⇒ G(θi) ≡ (1− θi)ui(1/3) + θiu(2/3)−
θi
3
− 2
3
ui(1/2)  0.
Since ui is strictly concave, it follows that G(θi) > 0 (for all θi).
28 Hence, T SSSi > B
SS
i .
So, in this version of the baseline model, where there are no costs of dividing power
(see section 7.2 below for that), tricameralism Pareto-dominates bicameralism because
of the risk reduction factor. This point may generalize to some extent, as we now
brieﬂy show.
Suppose the legislature is composed of n ≥ 1 chambers, all of which operate, for the
sake of illustration, under the simultaneous-term structure. Furthermore, each cham-
ber controls, and independently divides, 1/nth of the unit-size cake. Proposition 2
carries over, and it follows that the expected payoﬀ to principal i at the constitutional
moment from instituting a legislature with n such chambers is:
28This follows from the observations that G is linear, and that ui strictly concave implies that
G(0) > 0 and G(1) > 1.
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Vi(n) =
1
1− δ
k=n∑
k=0
[
n!
(n− k)!k!
]
(θi)
k(1− θi)n−kui(k/n).
It is straightforward to show that for any ﬁnite n, Vi(n) < ui(θi)/(1−δ), and that as
n→∞, Vi(n)→ ui(θi)/(1− δ).29 These properties imply that there does not exist a
ﬁnite n for which Vi(n) is maximal. While we have not been able to establish whether
in general Vi(n) is monotonically increasing, these results imply that for any n there
exists an n′ > n such that V1(n′) > V1(n) and V2(n′) > V2(n). In words, for any n
there exists an n′ > n such that a legislature with n chambers is Pareto dominated by
a legislature with n′ > n chambers. Of course, the risk-reduction beneﬁt is at work
here without the interference of any costs of increasing the number of chambers, an
issue to which we now turn.
7.2. Excessive Taxation: A Cost from Dividing Power. There are several pos-
sible reasons for why dividing power between two or more chambers can be costly from
the principals’ perspective, as evaluated at the constitutional moment. The calculus
of the optimal number of chambers needs to trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of dividing power
such as those derived from risk reduction against the possible costs. To illustrate the
possibility of such costs, we now extend the baseline model to enable us to see a few
29The argument is as follows. (1− δ)Vi(n) = E(ui(kn/n)), where E is the expectation and kn is
a random variable with a binomial distribution with parameters n, θi. The expectation of kn equals
nθi, and hence E(kn/n) = θi. It follows from Jensen’s inequality (and since ui is strictly concave)
that for any ﬁnite n, E(ui(kn/n)) < ui(E(kn/n)). Hence, for any ﬁnite n, (1− δ)Vi(n) < ui(θi). To
show convergence, take any  > 0 and it is easy to show that as n tends to inﬁnity, Prob[kn/n > θi−]
converges to one (given continuity of ui).
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novel aspects of the relative merits of dividing power. To keep matters simple, we
restrict attention to the choice between a bicameral legislature and a unicameral one;
i.e., we do not consider legislatures with three or more chambers. Furthermore, in
this formal structure we will suppress the choice of term structure, and assume that
legislators in any chamber operate under a simultaneous term structure.30
The core feature of our extension is that the size of the cake is now endogenously
determined through the tax rate chosen by the legislature. As in the baseline model,
there are two districts, with possibly unequal population sizes, N1 and N2, where the
income of each citizen in district i is yi > 0.
If the legislature consists of a simultaneous-term single chamber, then the legislator
who is recognized to make the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer proposes a tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1]
and a partition of the tax revenue (cake) between the two legislators (districts), where
the size of the cake equals τ(y1N1+y2N2). If the oﬀer is rejected, then the status quo
policy remains in force in the period in question, which is that no taxes are levied and
no pork is thus available for distribution to the districts. As in the baseline model,
the legislator from district i is recognized each period with probability θi.
If all that were involved is extracting revenue from citizens via taxes, repackaging
it, and then returning it to the districts, then the process would be one of pure
redistribution. However, it would then not be possible to improve upon the status
quo for both districts; it is purely a money transfer. We are assuming something
30We conjecture that some of the main insights concerning the relative merits of bicameralism
versus unicameralism established below, in the context of the extended set-up, carry over to staggered
term structures. However, this needs to be formally established, and we leave that for future research.
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diﬀerent. The legislature extracts revenues and then transforms these into a package
of local public goods. If each district values its local public good more than the tax
revenue it loses, then a Pareto improvement is eﬀected. That is, the legislature helps
each district alleviate local coordination/collective action diﬃculties, enabling it to
provide itself with public goods.
The probability that a legislator is reelected Π now depends on the amount x of
per capita pork (local public goods) he brings to his district during his most recent,
one-period term in oﬃce, and on the tax rate τ imposed in the period in question. It
is natural to assume that Π is increasing in x but decreasing in τ . However, citizens,
when deciding whether or not to reelect an incumbent legislator, tend to put relatively
more weight on the amount of per capita pork that he secured for them (which we
assume is observable) than on the tax rate set by the legislature (of which he is a
member). We capture this by assuming that the marginal impact of x on Π is strictly
greater than that due to τ . In summary, we make the following assumptions on this
extended probability of reelection function:
Assumption 4. Π is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, increasing in x and decreasing
in τ . Furthermore, for any x, τ : ‖Π1(x, τ)‖ > ‖Π2(x, τ)‖.
Proposition 1 carries over and hence pure-strategy equilibria will necessarily be
Markov. Given that, the following result may be established:
Proposition 5 (Taxation and Pork Allocation under Unicameralism). In the ex-
tension of the baseline model described above, in a unicameral simultaneous-term
legislature in which legislators ﬁnance pork spending via taxation, there is a unique
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equilibrium. In any period in which legislator i is recognized, his oﬀer (xi, τi), where
xi is the per-capita pork for his district and τi is the proposed tax rate, is a solution
to the maximization problem stated below, and this oﬀer is accepted by the legislator
from district j (i = j):
max
xi,τi
Π(xi, τi)(9)
s.t. 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1(10)
0 ≤ xi ≤ τi(y1N1 + y2N2)
Ni
and(11)
Π
(
τi(y1N1 + y2N2)− xiNi
Nj
, τi
)
≥ Π(0, 0).(12)
Proof. Given that equilibria are necessarily in Markov pure strategies, the formal
argument parallels those in the proof of Proposition 2. We thus omit that, but
instead provide an informal argument. We ﬁrst note that it follows from the “one-
shot deviation” principle of dynamic programming that in a Markov equilibrium (ME,
for short) each legislator’s objective boils down to maximizing his current probability
of reelection. Now, in any ME, the legislator from district i can always oﬀer the
status quo policy in which no taxes are raised and there is no pork available. Any
diﬀerent policy (xi, τi) must thus oﬀer the legislator from district j a probability of
reelection that is at least as good as what it would be with the status quo policy.
Hence, acceptable policies must satisfy legislator j’s individual rationality constraint,
inequality (12). Notice that total tax revenue raised is τi(y1N1+y2N2) and the amount
of per capita pork allocated to district j is as stated in the ﬁrst argument in Π on
the lefthand side of (12). Together with the feasibility constraints (10) and (11), the
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legislator from district i chooses an oﬀer which maximizes his probability of reelection
subject to satisfying these three conditions. 
Since our main objective is to compare and contrast the consequences in this ex-
tended set-up of dividing power, we will shortly proceed to deriving the equilibrium
solution for the bicameral setting. Once we have done that, we will then undertake
a comparative analysis and during that process we will return to Proposition 5 and
provide a characterization of the solution of the optimization problem stated in this
proposition. But there is one feature of the solution we would like to mention now.
In this extended set-up it is no longer the case that the agenda-setter can allocate
all the cake to his district (unlike in the baseline model in which the size of the
cake was ﬁxed and exogenously given; cf. Proposition 2). Notice that if, for any
τi > 0, the legislator from district i sets xi to its upper bound, then the individual
rationality constraint of the legislator from district j, (12), would be violated (since,
given Assumption 4, Π is decreasing in the tax rate). Not surprisingly, raising some
tax revenue across the two districts but without allocating any pork to a district is
worse than the status quo policy from a legislator’s perspective. So, in this extended
set-up, with multidimensional policy, extremal allocations of pork, which featured in
the baseline model, cannot form part of the equilibrium solution. Having said that,
at the solution to the maximization problem, the individual rationality constraint
(12) binds (for otherwise the agenda-setter could increase his reelection probability
by allocating to his district a little more of the cake), and hence the agenda-setter
nonetheless extracts most of the surplus.
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We now turn to the bicameral legislature, where power is divided between two
chambers, which we assume are identical and both operate under the simultaneous-
term structure. Here are the main features that are speciﬁc to the bicameral leg-
islature. In each period, a legislator is randomly and independently recognized in
each chamber. The probability that in each chamber the legislator from district i
is recognized is θi. The two agenda-setters simultaneously and independently make
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to their respective chamber partners, who simultaneously and
independently decide whether or not to accept the proposals. There is no communi-
cation, cooperation or collusion across the chambers. They operate separately.
We want to capture the notion that tax policy is determined “jointly” by the two
chambers. We model this as follows. The oﬀer of a legislator in each chamber contains
a proposed tax rate. The actual tax rate announced by the legislature will be the
average of the two proposed tax rates, which in turn determines the total tax revenue
(the total size of the cake), which, like in the baseline model, is to be divided equally
between the two chambers. It should be noted that the status quo policy — no
taxation and no cake — is changed in any period if and only if in each of the two
chambers, the respective oﬀers made are accepted by the respective legislators. Thus,
if the oﬀer in either chamber is turned down then the status quo policy remains in
force in the period in question.
We assume that, in each period, after legislators from each chamber are recognized,
this becomes known to all legislators in both chambers before any actions are taken.
Hence, for example, the legislator who is recognized in a chamber can condition his
oﬀer on whether his counterpart has also been recognized in the other chamber or not.
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Indeed, since the actual tax rate will be the average of the proposed tax rates, the two
agenda-setters are in a game-theoretic situation, and we will, unlike in the baseline
model, look for a Nash equilibrium in oﬀers across the two chambers. Furthermore,
it is assumed that when responding to an oﬀer, a legislator knows the oﬀer made in
the other chamber, which thus allows him to calculate the actual tax rate if he and
the responder in the other chamber accept their respective oﬀers.
It is straightforward to verify that Proposition 1 carries over here as well, and hence
equilibria will necessarily be in Markov pure strategies. Given that, we can establish
the following:
Proposition 6 (Taxation and Pork Allocation under Bicameralism). In the extension
of the baseline model described above under a bicameral legislature in which legislators
ﬁnance pork spending via taxation and power is divided across the two chambers, there
is a unique equilibrium in which, in any period, acceptable oﬀers are made, which
are as follows. Suppose that the legislators recognized in the two chambers are from
districts i and j, where i, j = 1, 2. Then the equilibrium oﬀers of legislators i and j,
(xji , τ
j
i ) and (x̂
i
j, τ̂
i
j), respectively, are solutions to the following pair of (simultaneous)
maximization problems:31
31(xji , τ
j
i ) is legislator i’s oﬀer, who is the agenda setter in one of the chambers, say chamber 1,
given that legislator j is the agenda-setter in chamber 2. And (x̂ij , τ̂
i
j) is legislator j’s oﬀer, who is
the agenda setter in chamber 2, given that legislator i is the agenda-setter in chamber 1.
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Problem 1:
max
xji ,τ
j
i
Π
(
xji ,
τ ji + τ̂
i
j
2
)
s.t. 0 ≤ τ ji ≤ 1, 0 ≤ xji ≤
[(τ ji + τ̂
i
j)/2](y1N1 + y2N2)
2Ni
and Π
(
[(τ ji + τ̂
i
j)/2](y1N1 + y2N2)− 2xjiNi
2Nk
,
τ ji + τ̂
i
j
2
)
≥ Π(0, 0), where k = i.
Problem 2:
max
x̂ij ,τ̂
i
j
Π
(
x̂ij,
τ ji + τ̂
i
j
2
)
s.t. 0 ≤ τ̂ ij ≤ 1, 0 ≤ x̂ij ≤
[(τ ji + τ̂
i
j)/2](y1N1 + y2N2)
2Nj
and Π
(
[(τ ji + τ̂
i
j)/2](y1N1 + y2N2)− 2x̂ijNi
2Nl
,
τ ji + τ̂
i
j
2
)
≥ Π(0, 0), where l = j.
Proof. The argument is an extension of the proof of Proposition 5 in which the oﬀers
made in each period by the two agenda-setters in the two chambers are in a Nash
equilibrium of the appropriate game. In a ME, it follows that each legislator’s objec-
tive is to maximize their own current reelection probability. The solution to problem
1 deﬁnes i’s reaction function to an arbitrary oﬀer made by the agenda-setter, j, in
the other chamber. Symmetrically, problem 2 gives rise to j’s reaction function. A
ﬁx point of these reaction functions deﬁnes the equilibrium oﬀers. 
Like in the solution to the maximization problem that deﬁnes the equilibrium in
the unicameral setting (cf. Proposition 5), in each of two maximization problems
stated in Proposition 6 that together deﬁne a ME in the bicameral setting, the two
individual rationality (IR) constraints bind, but the feasibility constraints don’t. That
is, while each agenda-setter will extract as much of the surplus as possible, he needs
to allocate some pork to the district of his chamber partner (for otherwise the status
quo policy will be preferred).
BICAMERALISM 49
Comparing the IR constraint of the maximization problem that deﬁnes the uni-
cameral equilibrium with those that deﬁne the bicameral equilibrium, notice that,
not surprisingly, for any pair of policies (x, τ), it is easier to satisfy the IR constraint
in the unicameral setting than in the bicameral setting, because in the former setting
there is twice as much pork from which a given x is deducted. This intuitive obser-
vation provides the key for the result that the set of acceptable and feasible oﬀers
under bicameralism is strictly contained in the corresponding set under unicameral-
ism. This means it is possible that under bicameralism the status quo policy is the
only feasible and acceptable policy while that is not the case under unicameralism.
Consequently, there is relatively greater scope for gridlock under bicameralism. We
summarise this in the following corollary:
Corollary 1 (Gridlock under Bicameralism). There is relatively greater prospect of
gridlock — no change from the status quo policy — under bicameralism than under
unicameralism.
We now consider scenarios in which the set of acceptable and feasible oﬀers un-
der bicameralism contains policy vectors other than the status quo policy. In such
cases, the equilibrium tax rates under bicameralism will in general be higher than the
equilibrium tax rates under unicameralism. The intuition for this result is straight-
forward, and can be gleaned by comparing the maximization problems stated in these
two propositions. It is this. Under bicameralism, each agenda-setter gets to control
and divide only one-half of the total tax revenues raised, and hence each has an in-
centive to set a higher tax rate than he would under unicameralism. It is “as if” the
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agenda-setter in each chamber is being “held-up” by the agenda-setter in the other
chamber, in having to relinquish one-half of the tax revenues raised:
Corollary 2 (Higher Taxes under Bicameralism). Tax rates under bicameralism will
tend to be higher than under unicameralism.
While the equilibrium policy (the tax rate and allocation of pork) will diﬀer under
these two alternative legislative structures, which one is preferred by the two principals
at the constitutional moment, in period −1, depends on which policy is closer to the
one they would jointly select (the ﬁrst-best). We assume that principals, as before,
discount future payoﬀs with a common discount factor δ < 1, and assume that their
instantaneous utility is the sum of net income and utility from pork (as in the baseline
model). That is, principal i’s utility is (1− τ)yi + ui(x). This implies that aggregate
welfare per period is given by
(1− τ)(y1N1 + y2N2) + u1(x1)N1 + u2(x2)N2 where x1N1 + x2N2 = τ(y1N1 + y2N2).
It may be noted that since ui is strictly increasing and strictly concave, the ﬁrst-best
tax rate will be strictly positive, and hence diﬀerent from the status quo policy of
a zero tax rate. The risk reduction beneﬁt from bicameralism will continue to arise
in this extended baseline model. But now there is a potential cost from bicameral-
ism, which is that the equilibrium policy vectors under a bicameral setting deviate
further away from ﬁrst-best policy than the equilibrium policy vectors arrived at in
a unicameral setting. Of course, this need not be case, since this depends on the
relative positions of the two sets of equilibrium policies and the ﬁrst best policy. And
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that, in turn, depends on the the utility functions and the probability of reelection
functions. But when the cost exists, then the optimal number of chambers (one or
two) depends, in eﬀect, on the comparing the costs from excessive taxation against
the beneﬁts from risk reduction.
8. Conclusions and Future Directions
The concerns expressed by the authors of The Federalist in arguing for bicameral
legislative arrangements centered on majority tyranny and delay. The results we have
provided do so as well, but from a slightly diﬀerent perspective. Bicameralism does,
indeed, reduce the prospects of majority tyranny in the sense that two chambers pro-
vide greater insurance against domination by an agenda-setter agent of one (class of)
principal to the exclusion of others. Bicameralism is associated with delay as well in
the sense that there are circumstances in which a unicameral legislature will pass new
legislation but a bicameral legislature is saddled with the status quo. Interestingly,
Hamilton and Madison saw this, like the control of majority tyranny, as an advantage
of bicameralism. We believe that, in their advocacy for the US constitution, they were
not prepared to acknowledge the downside of delay, what modern scholars term grid-
lock. Nor were they prepared to speculate about taxation propensities in a bicameral
legislature. So we have concluded that the risk-spreading virtues of multicameralism
must be balanced against the prospects of inaction on the one hand, and the possi-
bility of larger government on the other. Empirically, of course, most of the world’s
democracies have settled on a legislative branch with one or two chambers, though
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some have included some (partial) legislative powers in other branches of government
(e.g., executive veto, judicial negativing of statutes).
We have had considerably less to say about the circumstances in which democra-
cies choose a single chamber or multiple chambers, partial renewal or full renewal.
As noted, such arrangements are ex ante optimal at any given constitutional moment
depending upon ”parameters,” but we haven’t oﬀered much insight beyond this. We
believe the next research step should be to build in heterogeneity among principals
and thus diversity among agent objectives. Bicameralism, as we noted at the outset,
is associated empiricially with large states, with rich states, and with federal states –
that is, with states that are nominally more complex economically and more layered
politically. Unicameralism is found in states with a lower GDP per capita, with a
more compact geography, and with more centralized governance. Under what circum-
stances would such factors induce constitution writers to make one set of institutional
choices rather than another? We also believe it desirable to introduce more hetero-
geneity among agents. Re-elected incumbents are, in important ways, diﬀerent from
newly minted legislators – their human capital in the form of substantive expertise
and legislative experience may well have performance eﬀects that should be captured
in an extension of the present model. Finally, it would be interesting to explore the
possibility (and consequences thereof) of cooperation across space and time: cooper-
ation, in any given session, amongst legislators within a single chamber and/or across
chambers, and intertemporal cooperation. In order to sustain cooperative behaviour
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in equilibrium one needs to relax the informational assumption (Assumption 3) that
has underpinned the analysis in this chapter.32
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Fix an arbitrary pure-strategy equilibrium,
and ﬁx an arbitrary period t ≥ 1. We will show that the equilibrium actions in
period t are conditioned on at most zt (the amount of cake obtained by the period-t
LATE legislator in period t− 1), but on no other bits of observed history, which then
establishes the proposition. The argument involves induction.
First, note that A3 implies that there exists a T ≥ t+ 2 such that the equilibrium
actions in any period from and including period T onwards cannot be conditioned on
the actions taken in any period before and including t− 1. Second, we establish the
following inductive step:
Fix an arbitrary period s, where s ≥ t + 1. If the equilibrium actions in any period
from and including period s + 1 onwards are not conditioned on the actions taken in
any period before and including period t− 1, then the same is true of the equilibrium
actions in period s.
Proof of inductive step. Since s ≥ t+ 1, none of the actions in any period before and
including period t− 1 directly aﬀects the payoﬀs of any legislator in period s. Given
this and the hypothesis of the inductive step, it follows that the equilibrium expected
payoﬀ to a legislator from period s onwards does not depend on the actions in any
32In Muthoo and Shepsle (2006) — where we develop an analysis of intertemporal cooperative
equilibria in staggered-term, unicameral legislatures — the role of information is assessed in some
greater detail.
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period before and including t − 1. Let ht−1 and h′t−1 denote two diﬀerent histories
till the end of period t − 1 that are observable to an arbitrary legislator in period
s. Furthermore, let h denote a history of actions observed by the arbitrary legislator
between and including periods t and s − 1. Hence, two diﬀerent observed histories
at the beginning of period s are (ht−1, h) and (h′t−1, h). The equilibrium expected
payoﬀs to this arbitrary legislator from period s onwards will be the same following
either observed history (for any set of period s actions and given the equilibrium pure-
strategy). Hence, given Assumption 2, the legislator’s equilibrium actions in period
s following these two observed histories are the same. The completes the proof of the
inductive step.
Hence, it now follows from the principle of mathematical induction that the equi-
librium actions in any period from and including period t + 1 are not conditioned
on the actions taken in any period before and including period t − 1. The desired
conclusion follows immediately.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We ﬁrst show that the strategy described in
the proposition, when adopted by all legislators is the unique stationary Markov equi-
librium, and then we establish the non-existence of non-stationary Markov equilibria.
This then establishes the proposition.
Since in the baseline model there is no payoﬀ-relevant link between two chambers
in a bicameral legislature, this means that a stationary Markov pure strategy of a
legislator in a chamber is not conditioned on events or actions of legislators in the
other chamber. Hence, it suﬃces to establish the result for a unicameral legislature.
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We do so below in the context of a unicameral staggered-term chamber; the argument
for a unicameral simultaneous-term chamber is similar and hence omitted.
A stationary Markov pure strategy for a legislator from district i (i = 1, 2) in a
unicameral, staggered-term chamber is made up of two numbers, kiE and kiL, and
two functions, fiE and fiL: kin denotes the legislator’s demand when he is type n,
and fin : [0, 1]→ {“Accept”,“Reject”} such that fin(x) denotes whether the legislator
accepts or rejects the demand x when he is type n, where n = E,L (E stands for
EARLY and L stands for LATE). Fix an arbitrary stationary Markov equilibrium,
and let Wi denote the expected payoﬀ associated with this equilibrium to the legislator
when he is EARLY at the beginning of any period (before the proposer is randomly
selected). We ﬁrst establish the following result:
Claim 1. If the probability of reelection Π satisﬁes Assumption 1, then a legislator
accepts any oﬀer when EARLY and any oﬀer when LATE.
Proof of Claim 1. To establish this claim, we need to show that the legislator, when
EARLY and when LATE, respectively, accepts any demand x ∈ [0, 1] made by the
proposer. It follows from the One-Shot Deviation Principle that the legislator, when
EARLY, accepts a demand x ∈ [0, 1] if and only if HiE(x) ≥ HiE(1), where HiE(x) =
b + [θjEΠ(1− x, yiE) + (θiL)Π(1− x, yiL)]Wi, where
yiE =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− kjE if fiL(kjE) =“Accept”
0 if fiL(kjE) =“Reject”
and yiL =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
kiL if fjE(kiL) =“Accept”
0 if fjE(kiL) =“Reject”.
Assumption 1 implies that for any x ∈ [0, 1], HiE(x) ≥ HiE(1). Hence, this means
that fiE(x) =“Accept” for all x ∈ [0, 1]. A legislator, when LATE, accepts an oﬀer
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x ∈ [0, 1] if and only if HiL(x) ≥ HiL(1), where HiL(x) = b +Π(z, 1− x)Wi, and z is
the amount of cake received by LATE in the previous period. Assumption 1 implies
that for any x ∈ [0, 1], HiL(x) ≥ HiL(1). Hence, this means that fiL(x) =“Accept”
for all x ∈ [0, 1]. This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Given Claim 1, it follows from the One-Shot Deviation Principle that the pair
(kiE, kiL) satisfy the following conditions:
kiE ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
[
b+[θjEΠ(x, 1−kjE)+θiLΠ(x, kiL)]Wi
]
and kiL ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
[
b+Π(z, x)Wi
]
,
where z is the amount of cake earned by the LATE legislator a period earlier. That
is,
kiE ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
[
θjEΠ(x, 1− kjE) + θiLΠ(x, kiL)
]
and kiL ∈ arg max
x∈[0,1]
[
Π(z, x)
]
.
Assumptions 1 and 2 thus imply that (kiE, kiL) = (1, 1) is the unique solution.
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